A few months ago, the Chairman of the Africa and Global Health Policy Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Ted Cruz, hosted a roundtable discussion that tackled energy and critical mineral partnerships with the ambassadors and representatives of nineteen African countries and the African Union. Those African countries included Gabon, Mauritania, and Senegal. Now, President Donald Trump is slated to host the heads of state of Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal for a luncheon discussion at the White House. According to a White House official, next week’s event will explore “incredible commercial opportunities which benefit both the American people and our African partners.” If that is the intent, then the visit will provide an extraordinary opportunity for these coastal African countries to unlock tangible benefits from the increased emphasis on expanded trade and private investment in the African affairs of the U.S. Government. In parallel, it will provide the Trump Administration with a valuable opportunity to try to demonstrate to the American people that peace, security, and prosperity can be better achieved through commerce and investment than through development assistance. As with any White House visit, the event is not without known downside risks. To mitigate some of those risks, the invited heads of state should identify and address any serious concerns with bilateral relations held by the Trump Administration. They should also arrive with a concrete set of commercial and investment proposals endorsed by the private sector. Otherwise, they could experience the same fate as the recent South African delegation.
The Trump Administration selected a set of African countries with important similarities. One is that all of the invited countries are perceived to be of high importance in countering the spread of violent extremism on the African continent. That is because the U.S. Government is extremely concerned about the risk of violent extremism spreading into Coastal West and Central African countries with low impacts of terrorism (e.g., Gabon; Guinea-Bissau; Liberia; Mauritania; Senegal) from neighboring Sahelean countries with high impacts of terrorism (i.e., Burkina Faso; Cameroon; Mali; Niger; Nigeria). Another is that none of the invited countries have been designated as having an exceptional lack of reciprocity in their bilateral trade relationships with the United States. When the Trump Administration recently set reciprocal tariffs, no invited countries were identified as a “worst offender” among U.S. trading partners.
At the same time, the Trump Administration selected a set of African countries with important differences. One is that the majority of the invited countries have diplomatic relations with Israel. However, one does not (i.e., Mauritania). Another is that there is a wide range of military expenditure as a percentage of gross domestic product. At the low end, Liberia spent 0.7% in 2024. At the high end, Mauritania spent 2.2%. That suggests varying commitments to conducting independent operations. Yet another is that some of the countries appear to meet the stated criteria for the partial suspension of the admission of their nationals to the United States. One invited country has been identified as being at risk of becoming a recalcitrant country by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (i.e. Gabon). One invited country has a higher B1/B2 overstay rate than Burundi (i.e., Liberia). And, two invited countries have a higher nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors overstay rate than Burundi (i.e., Gabon; Liberia). That begs important questions about why those countries received invitations given that the Trump Administration recently imposed partial suspension on the admission of nationals from Burundi and Sierra Leone over their overstay rates and/or historical recalcitrance status.
The White House visit will provide coastal African countries with an exceptional opportunity to expand trade and private investment with the United States. The Trump Administration has indicated that it is committed to driving economic growth through expanded trade and private investment rather than development assistance. In response, the U.S. Department of State has made commercial diplomacy a “core focus” in African affairs. U.S. Chiefs of Mission are now being evaluated on their ability to advocate for market reforms identified by the private sector, facilitate new commercial and investment opportunities for U.S. individuals and companies, and implement major infrastructure projects that “unlock economic growth and attract private investment.” This focus on “trade not aid” provides the heads of state of Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, and Senegal with an extraordinary opportunity to pursue prosperity through commerce and investment in their bilateral relations with the United States.
At the same time, the White House visit will provide the Trump Administration with a timely opportunity to demonstrate that their strategic approach to African affairs is better than the strategic approaches of the Biden and Obama Administrations. That will require proof points. The Trump Administration will need to show that it actually has delivered on its promise to increase the prosperity of Americans through African affairs. Such proof points might include cases of new market expansion for U.S. companies, new U.S. investments by African nationals, and new reforms in African markets demanded by the private sector. In the process, the Trump Administration will be looking for proof points that reinforce other whole-of-government priorities. Examples could include higher utilization of U.S. maritime industries, expanded access to critical mineral resources, increased exports of American coal, liquid natural gas, and associated energy generation technologies, and improved capacity of African partners to conduct independent military operations. Those may be controversial, but they are entirely consistent with what President Donald Trump promised to American voters throughout the recent presidential campaign.
The recent White House visit of President Cyril Ramaphosa serves as a warning to the invited heads of state. To mitigate against a similar confrontation, they should proactively seek to identify and address any serious problems with bilateral relations held by the Trump Administration prior to arriving at the White House. For example, they should seek to identify and address any immigration and travel-related concerns that the Trump Administration might have about overstay rates, information-sharing cooperation, identity-management procedures, public safety risks, and terrorism-related risks. That includes antisemitism concerns. They should seek to identify and address any unfair exploitation concerns that the Trump Administration might have about the fines, practices, policies, and taxes that their government levies on American companies. And, they should seek to identify and address any strategic competition concerns that the Trump Administration might have about their relations with U.S. adversaries and rivals (e.g., China; Iran; Venezuela). That includes proliferation and sanctions-busting concerns. If they can take those concerns off the table, then they will create more room for laying down the cards on commercial and investment deals.
To be clear, that is not the only lesson to be learned from the South African visit. Another is that it is critical for African heads of state to arrive at the White House with a concrete set of commercial and investment proposals that have the endorsement of U.S. companies and investors. President Trump does not invite African heads of state over to talk about golf. He wants to deliver on his campaign commitments to the American people. Moreover, he wants to deliver on those commitments prior to the midterm elections. It is therefore imperative that the invited heads of state not only build rapport, ask smart questions, and make smart tradeoffs during their luncheon discussion. They should seek to jumpstart and anchor the deal-making process by putting an initial set of multiple equivalent proposals simultaneously on the table. That will signal to President Trump that their governments are willing and able to strike big commercial and investment deals with the United States. Unfortunately, the South African delegation failed to go down that path. It is therefore not surprising that their visit failed to significantly improve the prosperity of either Americans or South Africans.
